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6

LATINO PROTESTANTS AND THEIR
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT

HOW ARE LATINO PROTESTANTS ENGAGED IN LOCAL
COMMUNITIES AND THE BROADER SOCIETY?

On a rainy early spring morning in a modest brick Presbyterian church
just outside the Fruitvale neighborhood of Oakland, California, sixtyfour worshippers gather. The entire worship is in Spanish. During the
sermon, the pastor makes a passing reference to how few of the attenders now live in Oakland proper, that many have to drive farther than
ever for church services. The implicit message: the leadership of the
church realizes that gentrification of San Francisco has spilled over the
Bay Bridge and now threatens the availability of affordable housing
throughout Oakland. In response, the congregation has started programs that offer legal advice for responding to rent-hiking landlords and
identifying housing options around the city. Though resources and attenders tend to be somewhat scarce, the leadership has creatively organized in an effort to address the structural and policy concerns of housing. Beyond that, the pastor proudly notes that this church readily offers
immigration status services, computer classes, and English classes.
Later that day, down the road forty-five miles in San Jose (still in the
rain), over five hundred people gather in line outside the local Victory
Outreach church for the second night of the theatrical production
"Duke of Earl: Legacy." When the doors finally open, over one thousand attenders will overflow the sanctuary to the point that the foyer
I0I
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will be filled with folding chairs for viewing the drama on two flatscreen closed-circuit televisions. After warm-up acts that include a
praise team, two separate Christian rap performances, and a free "Duke
of Earl: Legacy" T -shilt being thrown to the loudest section of the
audience by the head pastor, the drama begins. Impressive production
values include fog, intricate lighting, stage prop cigarettes, a full band
for musical performances, and copious gun battles with blanks that
leave eardrums ringing. The entire event is in English. The plot of the
play earnestly encourages the audience to leave behind drugs, gangs,
and violence and to commit their lives to Christ and join a church. The
evening ends with a well-received altar call that overwhelms the stage.
Both of the aforementioned churches reside in the San Francisco
Bay Area. However, due to a host of reasons (including denominational
background, neighborhood context, leadership, and resources), they engage their respective communities very differently. They have variegated blinders and telescopes-social issues on which they focus intensely,
and those that they ignore or fail to notice. Moreover, while one congregation has an eA'Plicitly singular agenda, the other remains more multifaceted. In multiple ways, tl1en, these two congregations serve as a
microcosm of the diversity with which Latino Protestants across the
United States engage socially and politically.

POPULATION GROWTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSAL

Increasing Presence of Latinos

Latino Protestants continue to be a religious minority within an ethnic/
racial minorityl in the United States. However, both of these groups
demonstrate robust growth in terms of percentage and raw population
numbers. Moreover, as Latinos continue to expand in terms of numbers, they have also dispersed throughout the United States-aniving
in rural, suburban, and urban places that heretofore had little to no
Latino population. With that in mind, we know that Latino Protestants
will likely have a bourgeoning influence on public life in new ways and
new places in the United States. In this chapter we consider Latino
Protestant attitudes and behaviors related to social and political issues .
Consistent with the diversity seen in previous chapters, we see hetero-
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geneity in how Latino Protestants and their churches approach social
and political engagement. Moreover, any monolithic arguments about
Latino religiosity and public policy preferences will be found wanting
by the preponderance of social science evidence.
It remains difficult to overstate the critical role that Latinos have
played in the shifting sands of the U.S. ethnic and geographic landscape
in the last forty years. Owing to immigration and high fertility rates, the
Latino population has surged to the point that they have surpassed
African Americans as the largest minority in the nation. This population
growth has been described as a "demographic revolution." 2 Studies indicate that nearly one million U.S.-born Latinos reach voting age every
year. 3 Beyond that political power, they also have economic clout: U.S.
Latinos have a purchasing power equivalent to the world's sixteenthlargest country. 4 The 2010 U.S. Census rep01ted that 50.5 million people (16 percent of a total of 308.7 million) claimed Latino or Hispanic
ancestry. Moreover, Latino population increases accounted for more
than half of the overall growth in the total population in the United
States from 2000 to 2010.5
In addition to population growth among Latinos, we have also seen
population dispersal. These demographic shifts translate into new contexts for Latinos that likely demand adaptation of some sort- both on
the part of the receiving communities and the freshly arriving Latinos
themselves. The Census Bureau reports that the South and the Midwest experienced the most significant growth in Latino population between 2000 and 2010. Scholars have described these demographic
movements as "unprecedented geographic scattering ... where [Latinos] often revived dwindling nonmetropolitan communities" and
"transformed" U.S. urban landscapes. 6 In short, while Latinos continue
to cluster in traditional nodes in the Southwest and Northeast, they are
also dispersing to unprecedented locales like the rural South and Midwest.7
With shifting demographics, we see that Latino residential patterns
and geographic diffusion has not followed the pattern of African
Americans. That is, the story of Latinos in the United States in no way
serves as a replication of the African American narrative. In the early
years of the twenty-first century, "Latino's geographic scattering is national in scope and involves a broad range of places, from global cities to
rural boomtowns. Furthermore, it simultaneously involves concentra-

104

CHAPTER 6

tion and re-segregation as well as dispersal and, presumably, social integration."8 In contrast, the Latino population in the United States remains fluid and in flux. Part of the shift has included the Latinization of
the U.S. South. Some have argued that Latinos settling in the South
frequently receive the label of "undeserving outsiders" because of skin
color and perceptions about citizenship. 9 Of course, the cold shoulder
of the South has not been the uniform welcome for all Latinos in all
comers of the country-as some communities recognize newly arriving
Latinos as social and economic stimulators. These varying attitudes and
contexts also play a role in how Latino Protestants position themselves
within their local neighborhoods and the wider community.

Latinos and Residential Segregation

Even outside the South, Idelissa Malave and Esti Giordani claim that
the average Latino in the United States still "lives in a segregated, lower
income neighborhood."l 0 Moreover, while there has been a shift to
more rural regions, 91 percent of Latinos continue to live in metropolitan areas. 11 That is, they tend to be in urban or suburban locales. However, they also note, "On average, between 1990 and 2009, affluent
Latinos were more likely to live in neighborhoods with fewer resources
than poor whites." 12 That dissonance between relative wealth and a lack
of neighborhood resources festers because, similar to African
Americans, Latinos in the United States have suffered from residential
segregation: "The average or 'typical' Latino lives in a neighborhood
that is 45 percent Latino, even though Latinos represent just 17 percent
of the total population." 13 Of course, these patterns do not occur by
chance: Latinos have experienced residential restrictions from real estate practices that include redlining, steering, and predatory lending.
Beyond residential segregation, Latinos in the United States also suffer
from lower earnings (even when held constant for similar types of
work): 'With a median annual household income at $39,000, Latinos
earn $11,000 less than the median for the total U.S . population and
have the lowest weekly earnings out of any other group."l4 The discrepancies grow starker when considering wealth: the median wealth of
whites in the United States soars to almost twelve times the median
wealth of Latinos.1s
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Marta Tienda and Norma Fuentes acknowledge that the diffusion of
Latino populations has not always translated into socioeconomic mobility, saying, "Latinos residential dispersion evolved against a background
of rising income inequality, industrial restructuring, population aging,
increasing unauthorized immigration, and political polarization also has
implications for their integration prospects" in the United States. 16 Beyond just exclusion, we would also note that Latino Protestants have
been subject to what scholars have labeled a "double marginalization"
that has consequences for their social and political beliefs and behaviors. In other words, Latino Protestants' racial minority status within a
majority Anglo nation combines with a religious minority status as Protestants among a majority Catholic religious affiliation among their coethnics to situate them outside of the mainstream in two areas. As they
wrestle with a doubly marginalized identity, Latino Protestants, in particular, demonstrate a fluidity in how they engage with larger communities both socially and politically.n
In the end, Latino populations in the United States are both growing
and dispersing. Moreover, we see that in some instances Latinos have
also been marginalized in major U.S. cities, including Los Angeles and
New York, to the point that some scholars have described their residential situation as one of "hypersegregation." 18 Within this context, Latino
Protestants must consider how they will engage their neighborhoods,
communities, cities, and broader society.

CHURCHES BUILDING SKILLS AND PROVIDING SUPPORT

In the face of exclusion and disc1imination, Latino Protestant congregations necessarily become both refuges and sites of public action and
advocacy. That is, because religion remains so uniquely salient for Latino Protestants, it follows that their social and political engagement will,
in most cases, bear residue and evidence of their faith. Moreover, those
commitments will likely occur within the context of congregational life.
With that in mind, it only follows that Latino Protestant churches serve
as pivotal sites for social engagement.
Perhaps the most geographically focused and exhaustive study of
Latino religious life occurred on the shores of Lake Michigan: The
aforementioned Chicago Latino Congregations Study (CLCS). The au-
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thors describe CLCS as "a multi-level, comprehensive study of Latino
churches in the Chicago area." 19 Though they suffer from double marginality (or possibly because of it), Latino Protestants, according to the
authors of the CLCS, tend to be more politically active than their Catholic counterparts. The authors argue that, because of a more hierarchical church polity, Catholics learn comparatively fewer civic skills in
their parishes.
A number of other scholars have also argued that Latino Protestants
have more opportunities than their Catholic counterparts to enhance
civic skills that translate into a form of social capital. 20 Proponents of
this argument claim, again, that the hierarchical nature of Catholicism
limits the ability of attenders to organize and practice relevant political
tactics. Paul Djupe and Jacob Neiheisel find, indeed, that Latino Protestants receive more opportunities than Latino Catholics to "develop
leadership skills and be recruited into politics through the church." 21
They argue that there exists more synthesis between congregation and
community in Latino Protestant contexts: "In the broader, more Protestant society, the congregation is an independent community through
which members make ties and acquire skills. In Latino communities, on
the other hand, the congregation is better integrated into the community. Hence, attachment to a church in a Latino community helps the
member to tap into community networks ." 22 Thus, the synergy of
church and community leads to a localized form of social capital.
Building on that notion of social capital, sociologist Norman Ruano
finds that because of a lack of financial resources and hist01ies of voluntarism, Latino Protestant congregations function as sites of civic and
administrative skill development. The CLCS rep01ted that well over
half of all Latino Protestants indicated that they serve in some type of
leadership role within their congregation. Latino Pentecostals led the
way at 63 percent, followed closely, though, by Latino evangelicals and
mainline at 59 and 58 percent, respectively. 23 Beyond that, it should
also be noted that these Latino churches offer a locus for women to
exercise leadership. In all of the Latino Protestant faith traditions a
higher percentage of women than men rep01ted holding positions of
leadership. Of course, some of the gender-related leadership discrepancy relates to the fact that more women than men fill the pews of these
congregations. Still, it seems quite clear that "Latino women ... have
power and influence at the church."24
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In the end, Latino Protestant congregations, to varying degrees,
have a tendency to nurture social capital for groups that have been
historically marginalized. Beyond that, they provide both material and
social services. As Elizabeth Dias (Time magazine journalist) notes,
many Latino Protestant churches become "de facto healing centers for a
population with limited health care benefits. They act as food banks for
people with empty refrigerators. They house people avoiding street
violence. There's a lot more going on there than just saving·souls." 25
Latino Protestant churches, then, frequently serve as focal points of
community engagement and social service delivery.

LATINO PROTESTANTS AND THEIR POLITICS

Political Party Affiliation

Overall, Latinos in the United States have shaded toward support of
Democratic candidates. 26 The 2016 U.S . presidential election demonstrated that tendency in stark relief. In the months leading up to the
election, 54 percent of registered Latino voters indicated that the Democratic Party demonstrated more concern than the Republican Party
while only 11 percent said that the Republicans exhibited more-a 43
percent gap. 27 In the aftermath of the election, exit polls revealed that
66 percent of Latinos voted for Hillary Clinton-an overwhelming majority but a slip from the 71 percent received by Barack Obama in 2012.
Moreover, despite his provocative comments regarding immigration
and Mexicans, Donald Trump managed to gamer 28 percent of the
Latino vote-a decided minority, but one percentage point higher than
Republican candidate Mitt Romney's 27 percent from 2012. 28 Latinos
supported Trump in greater numbers than expected despite his strong
anti-immigration news and comments about Mexicans as dangerous and
undesirable. Also, although some pundits had described the Latino vote
as the "sleeping giant" that could sway the election, Latinos failed to
surge to the polls-even with the threat of mass deportation of undocumented Latinos and the stakes for the negative perception of legal
residents where high.
Even the 2016 presidential primary elections revealed the complexities of Latino voting patterns. Two of the Republican candidates (Sena-
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tor Ted Cruz of Texas and Senator Marco Rubio of Florida) highlighted
their Latino roots and pollsters watched to see if either could rally a
critical mass of Latino support. However, both senators' stances on
policy issues like immigration caused many Latinos to withhold their
backing. More than that, interviews with Mexican Americans who
found little solidarity with Cruz and Rubio's Cuban background undermined any notion of a Latino voting bloc for a Latino candidate. 29
Some scholars have noted, though, that Republican politicians in the
United States have made particular efforts to embrace evangelical Latinos on the basis of shared conservative social values related to issues
like abortion. 30 However, these invitations for alliance have found limited acceptance. In fact, in a May 2015 editorial in the Wall Street Journal, Russell Moore, president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention (the largest Protestant denomination in the United States), warned Republican presidential candidates to be wary of offending both white and Latino evangelicals. He
noted the growing political clout of evangelical Latinos and that all
candidates would do well to respect them: "The most evangelistic,
growing congregations in this country are filled with first- and secondgeneration immigrants. There is more salsa at our church potlucks lately, and we like it.... An immigrant brother in the next pew is a person,
a creation of God, not a pinata for politicians. 'Born again' comes in
Spanish as well as English versions-and so do voters." Moore noted
that in the weeks before he wrote, Latino evangelicals by the thousands
had gathered in Houston to discuss issues that included abortion, racial
justice, and economic opportunity. His message was clear: Politicians
who ignored evangelical Latinos did so at their own petil. 31
Other studies have also confirmed the tendency of non-Catholic
Latinos to be more likely to support Republican Party candidates than
Catholic Latinos. 32 For Latino Protestants, frequent church attendance
seems to have a relationship with social conservatism on some-but not
all-issues. For instance, political scientist Ali Adam Valenzuela found
that regular churchgoers were "significantly and substantively more
likely than infrequent attenders to identify as Republican" and to oppose gay marriage and abmtion. 33 However, when consideting views
regarding irnmigrant amnesty and economic welfare, Valenzuela found
no differences between regular and infrequent churchgoers among Latino Protestants.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT

109

Committed, churchgoing Latino Protestants remain a tantalizing
demographic for Republicans in the United States because when compared to Latino Catholics and the nonaffiliated they consistently report
more conservative political preferences. Moreover, Valenzuela finds
that Latino Protestants who consistently attend church demonstrate
substantially more conservative philosophies than their lesscommitted fellow parishioners. 34 In fact, researchers at the Pew Research Center noted that in the 2012 U.S . presidential election, among
the Latino electorate, religious identities played a crucial role in how
individuals voted. While 80 percent of religiously unaffiliated Latinos
and 75 percent of Latino Catholics claimed support for Barack Obama,
only 50 percent of evangelical Latinos said the same. Similarly, on the
eve of the 2016 election, the Pew Research Center reported a wide
discrepancy in how Latinos planned to vote: While 59 percent of Latino
Catholics indicated their support for Clinton, only 12 percent of Latino
evangelicals said the same.35 Perhaps not surprisingly, among Latinos in
the United States, religious affiliation seems to have a degree of influence on voting patterns. 36

Political Attitudes and Stances
More recently, in 2014, Pew found that, in general, Latinos in the
United States tend to lean toward Democratic Party affiliations. Over
half (56 percent) of Latinos indicated that they identified as Democrats
while only one in five (21 percent) leaned toward the Republican Party. 37 Even when examining through the prism of religion, the Democratic tendencies remain: Latino evangelicals (48 percent), mainline
Protestants (54 percent), and Catholics (58 percent) all lean more
Democrat than Republican (evangelicals: 30 percent, mainline Protestants: 23 percent, and Catholics: 21 percent).38 U.S. Latinos demonstrate a sharp break with their co-religionists on political party affiliation. A 2012 Pew study reported that 70 percent of white evangelicals
leaned Republican- more than twice the percentage of Latino evangelicals . In a similar fashion, white mainline Protestants also leaned more
Republican at a percentage (51 percent) more than twice that of mainline Protestant Latinos. 39
From their exhaustive rep01t related to Latino demographics, Idelisse Malave and Esti Giordani also note that "Overall, religious affilia-
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tion does not have the same impact on party affiliation among Latinos
as it does among white voters." 40 By way of example, they point to the
stark contrast in preference for the Democratic Party between white
and Latino evangelicals: while roughly half of Latino evangelicals affiliate with the Democratic Party, a scant 23 percent of white evangelicals
do the same. Correspondingly, "almost three-quarters of white evangelicals (72 percent) identifY or lean toward the Republican Party, while
only 36 percent of Latino evangelicals do." 4 1
Similar to Aflican Americans, Latino Protestants with strong religious commitment appear to be "less motivated by the faith -based political conservatism observed in white Christian circles." 42 There also
seems to be a common tendency for Af1ican American and Latino ministers to similarly focus more heavily on social justice issues than white
religious assemblies. White congregations, as members of the dominant
racial demographic in the United States, likely have less appetite for
issues related to marginalized minority groups. 43
The CLCS found that when examining contemporary issues that
ranged from U.S. intervention in Iraq to the U.S. embargo against
Cuba, mainline Protestant Latinos tended to express opposition to U.S.
foreign policy almost as much as Latino Catholics, while a distinct minority of both Pentecostals and evangelicals expressed negative views
regarding such foreign policy issues. It follows, then, that the same
study revealed that more evangelical (53 percent) and Pentecostal (53
percent) leaders viewed themselves as politically conservative, while
very few mainline (18 percent) labeled themselves the same way. Beyond political viewpoints, we also find differences among Latino Protestants in terms of political activities and engagement in Chicago. Interestingly, a full 93 percent of evangelicals claimed to never participate in
political activities. Roughly 83 percent of mainline Latinos made the
same claim. It should also be noted that the lack of citizenship status
should be remembered as a variable that might inhibit some from participating in overt political action. 44
While mainline Protestant Latinos show a slightly higher preference
than their evangelical counterparts for the Democratic Party, no such
discrepancy appears when considering the role and size of government.
When que1ied about whether they would prefer a smaller government
with fewer services or a larger government with more services, 62 percent of both evangelical and mainline Protestant Latinos indicated a
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preference for the latter. In short, both groups favor more government
services. However, neither Protestant group favored larger government
as much as Latino Catholics (72 percent). In addition, it should be
noted that a similar percentage of the minority among Latino evangelicals and mainline Protestants indicated preference for smaller government (25 percent of evangelicals and 29 percent of mainline Protestants). In this regard, Latino Protestants are markedly divergent from
the general public of the United States, where the majority (51 percent)
prefers a smaller government and the minority (40 percent) prefers a
larger government. 45
In terms of attitudes toward international intervention by the United
States, political scientist James L. Guth divides Latino Protestants into
two categories: Traditionalists and Modernists. 46 He describes Traditionalists as those who would be included in fundamentalist, evangelical, charismatic, or Pentecostal camps. Modernists, then, include most
of the mainline and any who identify themselves as liberal. Guth reports
that more than six in ten (62 .1 percent) Traditionalist Latino Protestants qualify as "Hardliners" (strong supporters of preemptive U.S. military intervention and "hawkish" foreign policy 47 ) compared to less than
three in ten (28.9 percent) Modernist Latino Protestants and about one
in ten (10.4 percent) Latino Catholics. 48 Thus we also see that religious
tradition predisposes Latino Protestant attitudes regarding international affairs.
Similarly, in their case study of Chicago, the CLCS noted that when
examining political attitudes and behavior through the filter of religious
tradition, a pattern emerges where Latino Catholics and mainline Protestants have more liberal inclinations than Latino evangelicals and Pentecostals. For instance, respondents within their study from "Catholic
and mainline churches were more likely to vote for Democratic presidential candidates than respondents in evangelical and Pentecostal
churches, and were more likely to disagree with the U.S. intervention in
Iraq." The study's authors went on to "note that the divide is not between Catholics and Protestants more broadly, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between mainline Protestant and conservative
Protestant groups." 49 Indeed, the heterogeneity of Latino Protestant
sociopolitical beliefs manifest in myriad attitudes and behaviors.
Even in an issue like immigration, where uniformity of Latino opinions might be assumed, we see complexity. Not surprisingly, the major-
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ity of overall Latinos (53 percent) tend to identifY immigration as a
pressing issue for the United States. Somewhat counterintuitively,
though, a comparable percentage of Latinos rank quality of public
schools (55 percent) , the federal deficit (54 percent), and the cost of
college (53 percent) as critical issues for the country as well. 5 Corroborating these findings , the Pew Research Center also rep01ts that while
73 percent of Latinos indicate that immigration reform is extremely
important or very important to them, more say that issues of education
(92 percent), jobs and the economy (91 percent) , and health care (86
percent) are extremely or very important to them. 5l In short, Latinos in
the United States do not monolithically focus on immigration as the
political issue of significance. Moreover, Latino attitudes regarding the
importance of immigration also diverge by religious tradition. The majority of both Catholic (59 percent) and mainline Protestant (57 percent) Latinos express the opinion that they understood immigration as a
"critical" issue. Fewer evangelical (48 percent) Latinos see immigration
as important. 52
On the related issue of "path to citizenship," again, the majority (67
percent) of Latinos supp01t the U.S. government "[allowing immigrants] a way to become citizens provided they meet certain requirements." Filtering by religious tradition, though, again also reveals a
slight heterogeneity ofopinions. While strong majorities of every Latino
religious group support a path to citizenship for immigrants currently
living in the country without documentation, Catholics (72 percent) and
evangelicals (75 percent) report nearly identical rates and mainline
Protestant Latinos dip to nearly two-thirds (67 percent) . Interestingly
enough, the religiously unaffiliated report the least amount of support
(59 percent). 53 While half of Latino Catholics (49 percent) report hearing clergy speak about immigration, only about a third of Latino Protestants indicate the same (35 percent evangelicals and 37 percent of
mainline Protestants). Moreover, when compared to Latino Catholics
(26 percent), a very small percentage of Latino mainline Protestants (16
percent) and Latino evangelicals (12 percent) report their churches
participating in immigration rights protests or boycotts. 54 Thus we continue to see that the contours of religion affect even issues that might be
assumed to have consensus among Latinos.

°
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PUBLIC ROLES OF LATINO PROTESTANT
RELIGIOUS LEADERS

On an issue-by-issue basis, we see a complex picture of Latino religious
leaders' political leanings. When asked directly about how they described themselves, about half of both evangelical (53 percent) and
Pentecostal (also 53 percent) Latino leaders described themselves as
conservative. In comparison, both mainline (18 percent) and Catholic
(20 percent) leaders indicated significantly less inclination to do the
same. However, these percentages should not be misinterpreted as
meaning that substantial swaths of Latino Catholic and mainline Protestant leaders understood their political identity as liberal. Most, in fact,
saw themselves as moderate (70 percent of Catholics and 64 percent of
mainline). Among Chicago Latino religious leaders, very few defined
their political leaning as liberal. Mainline and Catholics leaders had the
highest percentages (19 percent and 10 percent, respectively). Interestingly, while 7 percent of Pentecostal leaders identified as liberal, no
Latino evangelical leaders in Chicago indicated such a political identity.
Thus, we see an admittedly narrow band of liberal political leanings
within Latino Pentecostalism that does not manifest in that way within
Latino evangelicalism. This unique conservatism among Latino evangelical leaders also bore itself out when the prompt asked about political party affiliation. Among all Chicago-area Latino religious leaders,
only evangelicals identified with the Republican Party (33 percent)
more than Democratic Party (24 percent). For Pentecostal leaders, the
numbers were almost inverted: 32 percent Democrat and 22 percent
Republican. Democrats saw even more support among Catholics and
mainline Protestants. About half of both groups of Latino religious leaders identified as Democrats, and a very scant minmity (2 percent of
Catholics and 5 percent of mainline) labeled themselves as Republicans. 55
Regardless of their religious leaders' political affiliations, the majority Latino Protestants want to hear political views from the pulpit. Latino evangelicals (65 percent) , especially indicated appreciation for hearing clergy discuss political and social issues. Demonstrating the range of
opinions within Latino Protestantism, a significantly lower percentage
of Latino mainline Protestants (52 percent) agreed with that sentiment.56
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Political Activities of Latino Protestant Attenders

Compared to Latino Catholics, Latino Protestants demonstrate as high
(or higher) levels of political action.57 However, a close look at the
Latino churches within the Chicago study still reveals fairly low levels of
political engagement. For instance, the CLCS also found that evangelical Latino attenders claimed very little political activity. When queried
with whether they participated in a voter registration drive, volunteered
for a political campaign, or donated money to a party, over nine in ten
(93 percent) evangelical Latinos reported that they never participated
in any of the mentioned activities-the highest of any of the religious
traditions. Some of that seeming political apathy likely found resonance
with issues of citizenship status among these evangelicals: U.S. citizens
tended (16 percent) to be more likely to say that they had been involved
in political action than noncitizens (9 percent). Overall, the vast majority of Latinos in the study, regardless of religious tradition, indicated
high levels of political inactivity. Beyond evangelicals, the other three
religious traditions all had rates of at least eight in ten congregants
reporting having never participated in political activities . 58 Of course, it
should be noted that the apparent lack of political activity might simply
be a function of the survey question. When the same respondents re ported whether they had contacted a religious official within the last
year, the percentages of those reporting "never" dropped. Latino evangelicals still emerged as the most reticent with more than eight in ten
(82 percent) indicating that they had never spoken with or contacted a
public official within the last twelve months. Latino Pentecostals, mainline Protestants, and Catholics, though, should not be classified as activists: a high percentage of attenders from three religious traditions reported never contacting or speaking with a public official in the last year
(Pentecostal: 76 percent, mainline: 70 percent, and Catholic: 67 percent) . 59
Limited congregational engagement, though, should not be interpreted as evidence of political withdrawal being preached from Latino
pulpits. Instead, we see that almost half of the Latino religious leaders
from Chicago had requested their members to call or write a public
official. Beyond that, half of the religious leaders reported asking that
their congregation sign a petition. Catholic (60 percent) and mainline
(58 percent) leaders had a more pronounced tendency to ask that their
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congregants sign petitions than their counterparts in Pentecostal (40
percent) and evangelical (42 percent) traditions. 60
Overall, we also see that Latino mainline Protestants and Latino
Catholics tend to have similar views regarding the intersection of religious beliefs and politics. A little over one-third of each (38 percent of
mainline Protestants and 36 percent of Catholics) agreed that religious
beliefs played a "very important" role influencing their political thinking. In marked contrast, 62 percent of Latino evangelicals offered the
same assessment of religion and politics. 6l Thus we see within Latino
Protestantism a wide discrepancy in understanding how religion should
interact with political issues.

LATINO PROTESTANTS AND SEXUAL AND
FAMILY ISSUES

Attitudes Regarding Same Sex Marriage

Moving from politics to social issues, we also find multiple viewpoints
among Latino Protestants. Overall, in terms of same-sex marriage attitudes, studies find that Latinos who have at least some ties to faith
communities have demonstrated a resistance to progressive policies
that allow for the establishment of same-sex marriage. 62 That is, Latinos
of any religious background tend to articulate resistance to same-sex
marriage. The assumption, though, that the cultural conservatism that
exists among Latinos in the United States serves as evidence of cultural
Roman Catholic residue has been proven erroneous . Instead, we seesimilar to the general population- conservative Protestant Latino leaders and denominations have been at the forefront of those promoting
traditional marriage while opposing any movement toward the legalization of same-sex marriage.
A 2012 study by Pew found that 66 percent of Latino evangelicals
described themselves as strongly opposed to same-sex marriage. Similarly, a 2013 study by the Public Religion Research Institute reported
that 8 in lO (79 percent) Latino evangelicals opposed same-sex marriage. In short, Latino evangelicals, in pmticular, tend to be fairly uniform on the issue of same-sex marriage. 63 In the mid-2000s, for instance, the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference
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(NHCLC), a consortium of Latino evangelical leaders, led an effort to
mobilize against same-sex maniage. NHCLC materials couched their
argument in a way that framed opposition as motivated by desire for the
flourishing of the broader evangelical community. Their resistance,
they claimed, was not about being "anti-gay or discriminating against
anyone." 64 Rather, they argued that, along with faith in God, they simply saw families with both "a mother and a father" as "the primary
deterrent in the Latino community to drug abuse, gang violence, teenage pregnancy, and other social ills." With that sentiment in mind, it
should be noted that the NHCLC has sought to distance itself from
"the media-exacerbated image of angry white evangelicals who oppose
everything." 65 Thus in this narrative offered by the NHCLC, resistance
to same-sex marriage should be understood as for the benefit of Latino
communities, not as intolerance. Though the NHCLC lays claim to
being largest Latino evangelical organization in the United States, they
clearly do not represent all Latino Protestants. In fact, Christopher
Ellison and colleagues noted that in 2008 Reverend Ignacio Castuera, a
Methodist, argued in a televised debate that LGBT persons should have
the right to marry: "The Bible has many different models of sexuality
and many different models of family .... We cannot impose the Bible as
the right belief onto a population with people who are multicultural and
religiously diverse."66
Regina Branton and her colleagues found that Latino Catholics have
a significantly higher probability of suppmting civil unions for same-sex
couples, when compared to Latino Protestants. 67 Christopher Ellison
and his colleagues, though, note that evangelical Latinos, in particular,
tend to be much more resistant to same-sex marriage than Latino Catholics. In fact, evangelical Latinos who attended church regularly had an
84 percent chance of being less likely to approve same-sex maniage
than their Catholic counterparts. However, we begin to see disparity
among Latino Protestants and their views regarding same-sex marriage
when we widen the scope and consider mainline Protestant Latinos. It
seems that within that subset, church attendance has salience: Ellison
and his colleagues find that among mainline Latinos, regular attenders
disapprove of same-sex marriage more than Catholics, while non-weekly attenders from the same religious tradition tend to be more supportive of same-sex marriage.68 In sum, then, Latino Protestants have representatives on both poles of the same-sex marriage spectrum, while
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Latino Catholics seem to embrace more relatively moderate views. Evangelicals and regular attenders among mainline Protestants tend to
oppose same-sex marriage, while sporadic attenders among mainline
Latinos tend to support same-sex marriage. 69
In Chicago, when asked about same-sex marriage, Latino evangelicals and Pentecostals modify to the more traditional positions: nine in
ten (92 percent) evangelicals and almost all (99 percent) of Pentecostals
either "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" with same-sex marriage. In
contrast, only about half of mainline (45 percent) and Catholic (62
percent) leaders expressed the same reservations regarding same-sex
marriage. 70
Indeed, a 2012 Pew study found that among Latino Protestants
while 46 percent of those who attended mainline churches favored
same-sex marriage, only 25 percent of evangelicals felt the same way.
Moreover, neither group of Latino Protestants registered as much support for same-sex marriage as Catholics (54 percent). 71 Beyond that,
even among evangelical Latinos, views regarding same-sex marriage
remain diverse: 71 percent of those who attend church at least weekly
oppose same-sex marriage, while those who attend less often expressed
less resistance (58 percent). 72

Attitudes Regarding Divorce, Cohabitation, and Casual Sex

As already noted, for Latino Protestants, church attendance has salience for other social issues as well. In assessing Latino Protestant views
regarding marriage, divorce, cohabitation, and casual sex, Ellison, Wolfinger, and Ramos-Wada found that those who attended church more
regularly also tended to report more traditional views. Beyond that,
evangelical Latinos also reported more traditional views than their
Catholic counterpmts. Again, Ellison and his colleagues note that such
a finding undermines the long-held assumption that Latino cultural
conservatism results as a simple by-product of Catholicism. In fact, in
only one of the four issues under discussion, sanctity of maniage, do
Latino Catholics and evangelicals maintain the same level of conservatism. In terms of opposition to divorce, cohabitation, and casual sex,
evangelical Latinos "are substantially more conservative than Catholics ."73 Ellison and his colleagues claim that these views can be directly
traced to the evangelical tendency to believe "that the Bible is the Word
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of God and that it is without error and contains necessary and sufficient
information to guide most human affairs, especially those involving faith
and family." 74 That is, a strict interpretation of biblical injunctions leads
to social traditionalism among Latino evangelicals.

Attitudes Regarding Abortion

Religious tradition matters significantly when exploring how Latinos in
the United States feel about the issue of abortion. Likely due to their
overall higher levels of religiosity, Latinos generally express more opposition to abortion than Anglos. However, when we analyze differences
among religious traditions, we see tl1at evangelical Latinos are especially hostile to abortion- more so than their Catholic counterparts. Regina
Branton and her colleagues report that Latino Catholics have a higher
probability of also supporting legal abmtion in all circumstances than
Latino Protestants. 75 On this score, Latino Catholics represent the middle ground: About half indicate that abortion should be illegal in all or
most circumstances. Among Latino Protestants, though, there exists a
wide range of opinion. While seven in ten (70 percent) evangelical
Latinos say abortion should be mostly or entirely illegal, only 46 percent
of mainline Protestants agree with that sentiment. 76
In interpreting their opposition to abortion, John Bartkowski and his
colleagues argue that these conservative Protestant Latinos have transposed religious schemas from broader evangelicalism in the United
States. 77 That is, while both white and Latino Catholics seem more
prone to selectively embracing Vatican judgments regarding social issues like abmtion, both white and Latino evangelicals demonstrate
strong opposition to abortion. Beyond that, it may be the case that
Latino evangelicals embrace the antiabmtion positioning of white evangelicals in order to negotiate their double marginality: "Strong opposition to abortion situates evangelical Latinos squarely within the broader
universe of conservative Protestantism. At the same time, these convictions distinguish them from the 'lukewarm' commitment to Christian
principles exhibited by their Catholic peers ." 7R Of course, such a stance
by Latino evangelicals should not simply be interpreted as cynical political maneuvering. However, it should be noted that such attitudes regarding abmtion might have the latent function of creating alliances
with white evangelicals.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT

I 19

Attitudes Regarding Gender Roles

Compared to the overall U.S. population, Latinos in the United States
resist embracing traditional gender roles related to marriage and the
family. In fact, the vast majority (79 percent) express a preference for
having both wife and husband working and sharing child care and house
management as opposed to a more traditional arrangement where the
husband functions as sole provider (supported by only 18 percent). In
that way, Latinos articulate a predilection for traditional gender and
family life at a rate less than the general population of the United States
(given that 62 percent indicated support for traditional family structures). 79
Among Latinos, though, a discrepancy in attitudes regarding family
and marriage patterns emerges when examined through the filter of
religion. Whereas 26 percent of Latino Protestants expressed support
for more traditional roles, only 15 percent of Latino Catholics agreed.
Among Latino Protestants, evangelicals emerged as more traditional in
this regard than mainline Protestants (29 percent versus 19 percent). In
teasing out this idea further, Pew asked "whether a husband should
have the final say in family matters."SO Overall, about six in ten (63
percent) of Latinos rejected the statement. A religious breakdown,
however, proved insightful. Unaffiliated Latinos led the way in disagreeing with the statement at a rate of 74 percent, followed by Catholics at 67 percent. Among Protestant Latinos, 55 percent of those in the
mainline rejected while only 43 percent of evangelicals did the same. In
other words, evangelicals were the only religious tradition among Latinos in the United States to have a majority (53 percent) completely or
mostly agree with the statement, "a husband should have the final say in
family matters."Bl The theme of gender dynamics within Latino communities also emerged in other studies. Instead of examining gender
roles in marriage, a 2009 Pew study queried about gender based religious roles within families . When asked whether "men have a duty to
serve as religious leaders in the marriage and family," the majority of
Protestant Latinos (70 percent) agreed with that sentiment while Catholic Latinos remained split (50 percent). However, evangelical Latinos
expressed a higher level of enthusiasm (75 percent supported) than did
mainline Latinos (55 percent). 82
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VIEWS ON ECONOMICS AND POVERTY

Beyond family and gender issues, studies on Latino Protestants yield
interesting insights on their views regarding economic issues. Based on
their more conservative leanings demonstrated thus far, perhaps it
should not be surprising to learn that Latino Protestants, when compared to their Catholic counterparts, are less likely to indicate that the
poor face hardship because of a dearth of government interventions.
Although there is danger in oversimplifYing the nuances of how individuals think about the sources of poverty, it remains instructive to note
that the dialogue traditionally has two dominant camps: (1) those who
argue that pove1ty results largely from structural causes and (2) those
who claim that the attitudes, behaviors, skills, and talents of individuals
delineate who will be poor in the opportunity-filled United States. 83
With that dichotomy in mind, studies indicate that devout (frequent
attenders of worship services) evangelical Latinos are 55 percent less
likely than devout Latino Catholics to mticulate a sense that the poor
face difficulty because of a lack of government recourses. In other
words, evangelical Latinos express less sympathy toward the poor than
Catholic Latinos.
These divergent attitudes toward the poor are consistent with trends
seen among other racial demographics in the United States and the
manner in which religious identity influences attitudes toward the poor.
It seems that the idiosyncratic nature of Catholic and Protestant ethics
remain robust in spite of a racial or ethnic distinction: the "Catholic
ethic emphasizing sharing and material generosity" and the "conservative Protestant ethic being much more individualistic and moralistic
with regard to material wealth."8 4
The fact that evangelical Latinos look similar to white evangelicals
when explaining the sources of poverty, though, fails to translate into a
wholesale endorsement of identical social and political attitudes within
the religious tradition. For instance, Latino evangelicals and white evangelicals look very different when pulling the ballot box lever. The
Pew Research Center found that white evangelicals supported Mitt
Romney's 2012 presidential bid at a rate of almost three out of four (74
percent) while only four out of ten (39 percent) of evangelical Latinos
did the same. 85
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Of course, in the United States economic issues tend to be entwined
with issues of race. In their landmark tome about race and religion in
the United States, Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America, sociologists Michael Emerson and Christian
Smith noted that many white evangelicals embraced a "miracle motif'
regarding racial reconciliation in the United States. That is, white evangelicals tended to assume that as more and more individuals converted
to the Christian faith, racial alienation would decrease. In a seeming
test of the miracle motif regarding all social ills, Pew asked Latinos if
they agreed with the statement, "If enough people were brought to
Christ, social ills would take care of themselves." 86 Perhaps not surprisingly-since Emerson and Smith identified the miracle motif as a
uniquely evangelical manifestation-we see a discrepancy in whether
Protestant Latinos would endorse such a statement. While about twothirds (65 percent) of evangelical Latinos agreed with the statement,
only about half (51 percent) of mainline Protestants concurred. 87 Thus
we see that the evangelical "cultural tool kit" identified by Emerson and
Smith transcends some racial boundaries .

PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES BY LATINO
PROTESTANT CONGREGATIONS

Amount and Types of Social Service Delivery

Social engagement, of course, means more than social positions and
politics. Congregations of all religious orientations and racial backgrounds have entered into social service delivery, and Latino Protestants are no different in that regard. In fact, Gaston Espinosa has
argued that "Latino Protestant churches are more likely to provide social services than their Catholic counterparts" in many measures of
social action. 88 Individually, about one-third (32 percent) of Latino
Protestants volunteer with a neighborhood organization, a business, or a
youth agency. Evangelical Latinos (34 percent) do so just slightly more
than mainline Protestant Latinos (29 percent). For both sets of Protestants, though, the amount of volunteering declines when the engagement changes focus to tutoring or school programs (23 percent for
evangelicals and 25 percent for mainline Protestants). 89
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Of course, churches engage in social service delivery in multiple
ways . A Hudson Institute national survey of 452 Latino Protestant congregations found that 72 percent offered social service programs. 90 Beyond that, the CLCS found that every one of the Latino religious leaders they interviewed indicated that their congregations provided some
sort of health care-related service delivery to their respective communities in Chicago. However, Latino Protestants tend to offer interventions like health services less frequently than their Catholic counterparts- an interesting phenomenon because a higher percentage of Latino Catholics (61 percent) agree that guaranteeing health care for all
citizen's should be the government's responsibility compared to Latino
mainline Protestants (53 percent) and evangelicals (50 percent). 91
While Catholic churches average over five different types of health
service, Latino mainline Protestants (3.38), evangelicals (3.56), and
Pentecostals (2.61) all offer less . The authors attlibute the stark contrast
between Catholics and Pentecostals especially as explained by the fact
that Catholic churches tend to be much larger than their Pentecostal
counterparts and, thus, have more resources and capacities for healthrelated services. 92
The percentage of health services programming among Latino Protestant churches also varies among the mainline, evangelicals, and Pentecostals depending on the health service being delivered. The report
considers five areas of health services: Alcoholics Anonymous, sex education, diabetes screening, nuhition information, and blood pressure
screenings. Except for the area of sex education, a higher percentage of
Catholic congregations offered health services when compared to the
Latino Protestant congregations in the study. Beyond Catholic-Protestant distinctions, however, it should be noted that discrepancies exist
among evangelical, mainline, and Pentecostal congregations as well.
For instance, evangelicals (35 percent) are more likely to offer sex education than mainline (24 percent) or Pentecostal (27 percent) congregations. Evangelical congregations also lead the way (31 percent) on offering nutrition information (mainline: 19 percent and Pentecostal: 13 percent). On the other hand, mainline churches offer more (33 percent)
opportunities for blood pressure screenings than those of the evangelical (31 percent) or Pentecostal (24 percent) traditions.
Of course, in all these instance of health services rendered by Latino
Protestant congregations it should be noted that the vast maj01ity of
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these programs are largely informal structures that lack robust organization. 93 At the same, though, it could be argued that these congregations
possess invaluable knowledge of networks and neighborhoods that
might allow for more incisive health care delivery that targets the needs
of the population. In the end, the strand of religious tradition within
Protestantism has significant influence on how these Latinos engage the
larger community in terms of health services programming.

Latino Pentecostalism and Community Engagement

With all this evidence, it does seem clear that different strains of Latino
Protestantism have different concerns, p1iorities, and behaviors when it
comes to social and civic engagement. How do we account for this
heterogeneity? Some have argued that Pentecostalism, especially,
stands out among other faith traditions within Latino Protestantism.
Gaston Espinosa, in his comprehensive tome, Latino Pentecostals in
America: Faith and Politics in Action, claims that Latino Pentecostals,
in particular, avoid the traditional evangelical and mainline tendency to
decouple evangelism and social justice. 94 In other words, Latino Pentecostals meld an evangelistic social work that assumes an outreach that
demonstrates "the love and saving grace of Jesus Christ to a broken and
suffering world." 95 It seems that Latino Pentecostals reject notions of
the Social Gospel and Liberation Theology as they see both movements
as "not Christ-centered enough." 96 Indeed, among some Latino Protestant congregations there seems to be a strong sense that social engagement is not necessarily a political act. In our ethnographic research of a
Latino Protestant church in the Bay Area of California, we heard attenders/leaders tell us, "Feeding the poor is not a political act." In other
words, that particular congregation simply understood social engagement as the church being the church-they did not see it as a political
statement.
Ruano argues that a significant number of Latino Pentecostal congregations find themselves located in neighborhoods plagued by poverty and other attendant social problems . Because of that context, it becomes "imperative to understand the types of civic skills and civic engagement opportunities afforded to the congregants and whether they
translate into engagement outside of the church, and if so, under what
circumstances." 97 While Pentecostalism has long been assumed to be a
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faith that fosters closed, inward-facing communities, congregations like
Pastor Rene Molina's Restauracion Los Angeles hear messages that
encourage attenders to become active in political and social issues. Molina states that anyone who has citizenship has a responsibility to vote,
and if they cannot do that, they should be in marches that seek to
change restrictive immigration laws. Molina does not counsel his congregation to tum inward- in fact, he actively engages the broader community of Los Angeles by organizing with local African American pastors on issues of racial reconciliation. 98
While those congregations organize around racial reconciliation,
other congregations coalesce around other issues. For example, Victory
Outreach (highlighted earlier in the chapter), a coalition of six hundred
churches worldwide, finds focus in building "a tightly knit community
among recovering gang members ." 99 Sociologist Edward Flores describes Vict01y Outreach as an "evangelical-Pentecostal" network that
emphasizes a hard rupture with old communities and intensive involvement with the church- including evenings, weekends, and holidays-as
a method of "un-becoming a homie and joining the non-gang society."100 Other scholars have described Victory Outreach as an "emotional rescue ministry." 101 Church leaders encourage members to forgo
relationships, hobbies, and jobs that might interfere with paliicipation
in congregational worship and events. Moreover, Victory Church mimics the Pentecostal church's decentralized hierarchies and rigid religious boundaries to promote what Flores describes as a "segregated redemption" for former gang members.102 Though Victory Outreach
churches might stand as an outlier with their singular and aggressive
focus on gang rehabilitation, it does represent the energy that Latino
Pentecostal congregations have developed for celiain issues.
In the end, numerous studies have indicated that most congregations tend to provide some type of social service program- if not multiple programs. Latino Protestant churches are no different. However, it
is also clear that among Latino Protestants the rationales for and modes
of community engagement differ markedly based on religious tradition
and context.
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LATINO PROTESTANTS AND LOCAL PARACHURCH
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Of course, not all of Latino Protestant social and political life occurs
under the auspices of church. Instead, we see that they have crafted
other institutions and organizations "whose very purpose is to provide
some type of social service for the community they serve." 103 These
faith-based organizations (FBOs) maintain religious foundations , but
because of Internal Revenue Service regulations, they are required to
eschew proselytizing while providing a social service. Catherine Wilson
closely examined two of the largest Latino Protestant FBOs. The first ,
the Latino Pastoral Action Center (LPAC), is located in the South
Bronx in New York and is led by a Pentecostal minister, Reverend
Raymond Rivera. The second, Nueva Esperanza, is located in North
Philadelphia and is led by an evangelical pastor, Reverend Luis Cmtes
Jr. Consideration of these FBOs proves instructive because they allude
to the scope and diversity of Latino Protestant social and political engagement-they help to extrapolate the values, culture, and beliefs of
these faith communities. As Wilson contends, "along with congregations, FBOs help the Latino community to mediate its religious sensibilities and, in doing so, prepare this community for social and political involvement." 104 In other words, along with congregations, FBOs
have become integral organizing institutions for focusing Latino Protestant social engagement in the United States.
Wilson, in her study of Latino FBOs, claims that these organizations
tend to emphasize "the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the kingdom of God
on ea1th, and personal salvation at the end of one's earthly journey." 105
Despite the doctrinal differences that have divided the Latino communities over the years, Wilson argues that especially in cities, "social,
political, and economic injustices" have caused various strands of Protestants and Catholics to ally. Wilson goes on to note that Justo
Gonzalez, a United Methodist and prolific theological author, has
argued that the best path forward for urban Latinos in the United
States includes Protestants and Catholics aligning to "[walk] the same
path ."106
The aforementioned LPAC includes a local network of over three
hundred clergy and a mailing list that boasts over two thousand clergy
addresses . The FBO focuses on intentionally grooming indigenous
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leaders.Wilson claims that the theological underpinnings of LPAC can
be found in "the Pentecostal worldview."l0 7 That is, the flexibility and
spontaneity associated with Pentecostalism leads directly to the informal and adaptive responses of LP AC to the old and new social issues of
the South Bronx. While Pentecostalism has often been described as
"otherworldly," LPAC directly addresses current socioeconomic issues.
Wilson notes that Rivera, the founder and director, has stated that his
job is not confined to saving sinners but also "to do something about the
problems in the neighborhood." 108 LPAC's programming includes job
readiness workshops, gang prevention, English-as-a-second-language
classes, alternative late-night entertainment for youth, recreational opportunities, and collaborating with local agencies on the issues of at-risk
youth. LPAC's collaborators in these initiatives have ranged from the
New York City Department of Probation to Quaker Friends to Buddhist temples. In other words, LPAC has demonstrated a robust emphasis on community partnership formation that undermines assumptions about a more insular Pentecostal community. These pmtnerships,
though, all have to align with LPAC's focus on the "whole person" and
to help them transform their lives. In the end, Wilson desc1ibes LPAC
as a "ministry of personal outreach." 109
In somewhat of a contrast, Wilson portrays Nueva Esperanza as a
ministry of institutional development. In fact, Nueva's mission rests on
a "commitment to the creation of Hispanic-owned and operating institutions that serve the economic and spiritual well-being of the community."110 Yet both FBOs find similmity in a deeply rooted belief in the
transfonnative power of the Ch1istian message. Nueva has grown from
a $60,000 one-year grant in 1987 to cohosting President George W.
Bush at tl1e first National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast in 2002. Indeed,
there remains little doubt that Nueva stands as a high-profile example
of Latino Protestant social and political engagement. As further evidence, Wilson also notes that a Janumy 2005 issue of Time magazine
declared Cortes held a position among the "25 Most Influential Evangelicals" in the United States.
At least a portion of their fledgling influence should be traced to the
FBOs' strategic political maneuve1ing. Indeed, Nueva has been decidedly nonpartisan in its governmental alliances. Cortes has described his
political affiliations: "''m not red, and I'm not blue. I'm brown."lll In
essence, Cortes, in making such a proclamation declares himself a sup-
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porter of those who would advance the cause of Latinos in the United
States. To that end, Nueva has hosted high-profile politicians ranging
from Hillary Clinton to John McCain. Nueva refuses to limit itself with
any type of partisan affiliations.n2
The organization ultimately wants to spend political and social capital in ways that holistically benefit Latino communities and individuals.
Nueva understands that "the Latino community struggles simultaneously with both material and spiritual needs." 113 With that in mind, the
institutional development catalyzed by the FBO assumes that material
conditions of extreme want must be addressed before there can be a
resolution of spiritual issues.ll4 Wilson contends that since it views its
ministry as a business, "Nueva is a model of faith-based entrepreneurship." us
To that end, Nueva engages in educational, health, and social issues.
Tangible examples of these effmts include Laundromats, housing units
(including one project that consisted of fourteen units and cost $1.6
million that reflected a Spanish Revival-style architecture desired by
the inhabitants), and the establishment of the Career Link Center (for
job training and work readiness).l 16 In all these multifaceted efforts,
Nueva sees itself as a ministry primarily of institutional development.
At a national level, Nueva has been a vocal advocate for comprehensive immigration reform. Cortes himself, in fact, testified in July of 2006
before the Senate Judiciary Committee against a bill that included uncompromising language regarding any individual who "assists, encourages, or induces a[n] [undocumented] person to reside in or remain in
the United States." 117 Wilson notes that Cortes asserted that "such a
provision amounted to the criminalization of all Hispanic clergy and
non-Hispanic clergy aiding the undocumented."HS In multiple ways,
then, Nueva exceeds what some might assume an evangelical FBO
would focus on.
Nueva and LPAC offer a glimpse of the breadth and range of Latino
Protestant social engagement. Though outsiders might discern negligible differences in the theological foundations of the two FBOs, they
actually manifest in starkly different orientations to community social
service provision. While LP AC operates, as we might expect, from an
evangelical orientation- a focus on the individual and relationshipswe see that Nueva operates somewhat counterintuitively: still an evan-
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gelical organization, but with a strong emphasis on institutions and
structures.

NATIONAL PROFILE LATINO PROTESTANT
ORGANIZATIONS

Local FBOs, though, are not the only forms of parachurch organizations that Latino Protestants have formed. The nonpattisan posture
assumed by Nueva has also been adopted by the aforementioned National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference (NHCLC) and the
National Latino Evangelical Coalition (NaLEC). As evidence, the
NHCLC makes frequent use of a metaphor that they follow not the
"donkey" (the Democratic Party) or the "elephant" (the Republican
Party), but the lamb (a symbol of Jesus Christ). Led by the charismatic
Reverend Samuel Rodriguez, the NHCLC claims to be "America's largest Hispanic Christian Evangelical organization, representing more
than 100 million evangelical Latinos who worship in more than 40,000
congregations throughout the United States." 119 In addition, the
NHCLC reports that it represents seventy-five denominations and
faith-based organizations.I 20 The organization's website declares the intention "to reconcile Evangelist Billy Graham's message of salvation
through Christ with Dr. Martin Luther King's march of prophetic activism."l21 In other words, NHCLC positions itself as similar to traditional evangelicalism in the United States- but with a social edge that
pushes harder for issues of reconciliation. Indeed, language from the
organization's promotional documents demonstrates a desire to exceed
the traditional evangelical emphasis on gaining conversions to Christianity. The vision statement asserts that NHCLC seeks to "engage and
reform the culture by engaging, empowe1ing and equipping Hispanic
Christ following born again men and women to emerge as key influencers in all spheres of society and the marketplace." And in the event that
outsiders disregard the organization as another predictably conservative
organization, the NHCLC distances itself by noting their efforts to "enrich the narrative of American Evangelicalism by replacing the media
exacerbated image of angry white evangelicals who oppose everything
to a convicted yet compassionate multi-ethnic kingdom culture community committed to sharing truth with love." Yet NHCLC remains a
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decidedly evangelical organization when they refer to their emphases
on rejecting "moral relativism," "spiritual apathy," and "cultural decadence" while "elevating biblical marriage" and striving to "champion
life." 122 Such terms likely function as codes that nod to the more typical
white evangelical social concerns.
As a burgeoning player in national politics, news organizations will
frequently seek NHCLC's opinion on issues and politicians as representative of evangelical Latinos. In fact, during the prologue to the 2016
U.S. presidential election, Rodriguez served as a prominent voice, representing evangelical Latinos and how they might respond to the candidates. A Reuters article quoted Rodriguez discussing Ted Cruz's seeming lack of appeal for Latino voters: "At times, Senator Cruz finds it
difficult to identify or engage with his Latino heritage." 123 The article
also described NHCLC as a "key conservative group" in the United
States. As further evidence of the political clout of the NHCLC, it
should be noted that President Barack Obama's administration "regularly contacted" its leaders "about their Latino, Evangelical, and faithfriendly policies." 124 Moreover, as the Obama administration regularly
sought the counsel of Rodriguez, they have broadened the scope of the
relationship to the point that they have also discussed religious liberty,
marriage, immigration, and health care.l 25
Though not as large as the NHCLC, the NaLEC, led by Gabriel
Salguero, has also attained a rather high profile as well. The NaLEC has
similarly positioned itself as a "nonpartisan voice" for evangelical Latinos and Latinas "committed to the common good and justice in the
public sphere." In fact, when Tony Campolo and Shane Claiborne (two
progressive white evangelical leaders ) offered their assessment of the
2016 presidential election in the pages of the New York Times, they
insisted that the future of evangelical Christianity no longer resided
with whites. Instead, they identified Salguero and the NaLEC by name
and asserted that such leaders and organizations represented the future
of evangelicalism in the United States.l 26 Salguero has also served in an
advisory role to President Obama and is regularly sought by journalists
for quotes on policy issues. The NaLEC displayed some of the breadth
of their policy concerns in early 2015 when Salguero announced the
coalition's plan to organize around issues of childhood poverty, to suppmt body cameras as "a necessity" for all police, and to announce their
opposition to the death penalty. 12 7 In the end, both the N aLEC and the
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NHCLC stand as only two examples of the nascent civic and social
engagement of Latino Protestants.

A STORY OF IMMIGRATION IN A LATINO
PROTESTANT CHURCH

At a Latino Protestant church in Texas, we heard a testimonial from a
prominent lay pastor, Antonio-a sixty-two-year-old of Salvadoran descent. He related how he had been riding in a car with a friend driving
when police stopped the vehicle for tailgating. During the procedure,
the officer eventually asked for documentation. Neither man having
any, the officer arrested both Antonio and his friend and they would be
transferred and detained at a large immigration center in Pearson, Texas, for a month. As Antonio related his story to the rest of the congregation, he described his stay at the detention center as "marvelous."
Through the filter of his religious tool kit, Antonio reframed an experience that sounded less than marvelous as miraculous and abounding
with signs of God's provision.
Antonio explained in detail being forced to take off all his clothes
and remain undressed except for his undergarments for at least an hour
in a cold cell. He recalled being able to hear men crying out loud in
cells next to him. Once he received his uniform, he described to the
congregation that his minimalist meals included one packet of crackers
and a small juice-once a day. Ultimately, Antonio tells the congregation not to feel sorry for him: through his suffe1ing he garnered the
strength to comfort others and preach the gospel to them. More than
that, Antonio expresses his gratitude that the church held enchilada
sales to hire lawyers who crafted the pape1work that allowed him to be
released. At multiple points, Antonio mentions that his lawyers indicated that his past c1iminal history made it likely that he would be deported. However, because of the character references and testimonials
of the church leadership and pastors, Antonio received an atypical release. With a dramatic conclusion, Antonio announced that God had
the last word on his detainment and decided to release him. Claps and
shouts of "Hallelujah" and "Amen" fill the sanctuary as Antonio returns
to his seat.
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The church provided Antonio a platform to share his story and a
receptive audience by which he could humanize his experience as an
unauthorized migrant. Additionally, the religious framing allowed him
to highlight the conditions of others at this center in a public way. While
Antonio likely would not describe it as political, the message indeed
carried policy implications. Indeed, in his role as a pastor of the church,
he remained in communication with the families of other detainees.
Moreover, he continues to do religiously motivated activist work with
the detention center.
Antonio's case demonstrates how some Latino Protestant congregations function as sites of civic activism. Many of these churches do not
have the luxury of choosing their "mission" or how they might consider
socially engaging their community. Instead, as larger social issues like
immigration embroil congregational attenders, the church has no
choice but to become to some degree social activists. In these moments,
though, church leaders and attenders use their faith to frame the situation and offer hope for future resolution.
In other instances, Latino Protestant churches have started to offer
proactive programs related to immigration. A congregation our research
team observed in Fresno, California, has initiated a number of programs to allow members to remain in the United States. The church
understands serving the spiritual and economic needs of undocumented Latino immigrants as one of its primary ministries. On a personal level, the pastor writes letters of recommendation to be used for
"deferred action programs" or to apply for local jobs. Collectively, the
congregation raises money for farm laborers and undocumented families who struggle financially. In implementing these eff01ts, the church
intentionally stays within the framework of U.S. laws. When our research team asked the pastor what boundaries he might push, for instance, to reunite a family, he resolutely responded, "I don't work
against the laws of the U.S. This is my country, and I respect the law."
We found in this and other congregations that though the church empathized with undocumented Latinos, they established limits to intervention.
In effect, for undocumented church members who experience the
daily threat of deportation in Fresno, the leaders of the church affirm
the law by telling members to "stay put" and not attempt to reenter the
country illegally. In addition, the church encourages undocumented
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members to obtain Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITIN)
from the Internal Revenue Service so that they may declare their tax
liability. The leadership describes the practice as a method for establishing a "good record" that will be rewarded when immigration policy
reform eventually grants them legal status or citizenship.

THE MANY CONCERNS OF LATINO PROTESTANT
CONGREGATIONS

The many attitudes, behaviors, and organizations of Latino Protestants
undermine sweeping assessments. 128 The population growth and dispersal of Latino Protestants has contextually influenced how they
choose to engage. For instance, while immigration policy may be at the
forefront for many Latino Protestants, it certainly does not stand as the
only issue for which they demonstrate concern. Context matters. And
even within the same region, one church may feel pressed by gang
issues among their youth while another attempts to cope with gentrification. Moreover, theology matters. Religious traditions within Latino
Protestant populations have also led to various political attitudes and
social activities. Scale matters as well: Latino Protestant engagement
includes everything from highly localized congregations to national organizations that make news with press releases and have the ear of the
president of the United States. In the end, the bulk of social science
evidence clearly demonstrates a complexity in how Latino Protestants
engage in community and public life that remains to be fully disentangled.

